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The investment fund is an institution arrangement to realize 
capital-efficiency. From the macrocosm, investment fund can consummate 
financial system and enrich financial connotation; while reviewing from the 
microcosmic angle, the tenet for investment fund’s existence should be well 
operating for meeting the investors’ investment return and protecting investors’ 
interest. To obtain this goal, a well-done investment fund governance structure 
must come into being. Whereas, there exist many misunderstandings to 
investment fund governance, the main task of this essay is to clear up some of 
these misunderstandings. For approving the importance of investment fund 
governance, the essay chooses fund contract that is the fundamental basic of 
investment fund as cut-in entrance. The essay relies on the incomplete contract 
theory, which is a part of new institution economics. At first, the introduction 
of some contents of this theory aim to help comprehend the whole essay. Then, 
by using the theory tool, some phenomenons happen in the Chinese 
fund-industry development process are explained. In the next chapter, stick 
firmly to the contract self-enforcement mechanism and the third party’s 
function that are the two key-pivot of incomplete contract theory, the essay 
give a relatively particular and original analysis to reputation-mechanism, the 
third party governance and information disclosure, and all of them are united 
in the structure of investment fund governance. Depending on above analysis, 
the essay expounds the questions of fund contract’s performance. During 
discussion of this chapter, the ultimately conclusion of the whole essay is 
actually hidden. Here, reputation is not the problem of ethic but contacting 
with the ownership, exclusive asset, capital scale, market circumstance to 
illustrate the importance of reputation-mechanism in the contact 














regulation and marketable governance strength, i.e. intermediate organization 
and self-regulatory organization. Information-disclosure-mechanism 
emphasizes the significance of information in the incomplete fund contract, 
and the standpoint of “government intervene the supply of information and 
adopting compulsive information disclosure” is put forward. Thereinto, game 
theory is used in the process of analyzing reputation-mechanism and 
government activity regulation, combining incomplete contract theory with 
other relative theory, the two game-models educe quite a few summing-up. 
The last chapter begins with a debate about the fund organization form, i.e. 
corporation fund vs. contractual fund, which one is better. By the profound 
analysis, the essay points out that this debate root in the lack of knowledge of 
affair’s essence and definitely advance that “fund governance structure 
determine the fund contract performance”, integrated with the analysis in the 
former charter, the conclusion of whole essay was elicited. At the last, 
protesting betterment to the performance of contractual fund, namely, carry out 
the together-trustee model which is aiming to balance the controlling power 
and intensify the fund custodians’ supervisal. In fact, it further validates the 
essay’s conclusion from side angle.   
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2 中国证券市场 10 年来第一份对机构交易行为有确切叙述的报告，跟踪 1999 年 8 月 9日至 2000

































































哈特(S.Grossmanand&O.Hart 1986)在其经典论文《The Costs and Benefits of 














































                                                        
3 在 T 阶段重复囚徒博弈中，如果每个囚徒都有 P>0 的概率是非理性的（即只选择"针锋相对"或"
冷酷战略"），如果 T 足够大，那么存在一个 T0<T,使得下列战略组合构成一个精炼贝叶斯均衡：
所有理性囚徒在 t<T0 阶段选择合作（抵赖），在 t>T0 阶段选择不合作（坦白）；并且，非合作
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